Technological Knowledge and Offshore Outsourcing: Evidence from Japanese firm-level data by ITO Banri et al.
%1
RIETI Discussion Paper Series 11-E-052
Technological Knowledge and Offshore Outsourcing:







The Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry




Technological Knowledge and Offshore Outsourcing: 




ITO Banri   
Senshu University and RIETI 
 
TOMIURA Eiichi   
Yokohama National University and RIETI 
 
WAKASUGI Ryuhei   




This paper empirically examines the effects of knowledge capital on offshore outsourcing 
choices based on original survey data of Japanese firms. The results of a multinomial logit 
model demonstrate that firms’ offshoring is positively correlated with knowledge capital 
measured by their R&D activities or patenting,  even after controlling  for  other firm 
characteristics including productivity, capital intensity, firm age,  and export status. 
Further, knowledge-intensive firms are more inclined to choose foreign insourcing rather 
than outsourcing, suggesting that firms tend to internalize their technological knowledge 
in offshore sourcing. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades,  a  successful  global sourcing strategy has been central in  achieving  a 
competitive advantage for firms. Sourcing strategies involve decision making on the part of 
firms on whether to choose foreign insourcing (FI) through vertical integration or foreign 
outsourcing  (FO)  to an  unrelated firm, which include decisions with respect to  their 
organizational  form  in the global context.  To address this  issue,  theoretical  studies  have 
formalized concepts based on property rights theories that explain “make-or-buy” decisions. 
On the other hand, empirical evidence on the determinants of sourcing choices is scarce 
because of limitations of sourcing data. This paper aims to demonstrate empirical evidence by 
using firm-level data that not only identify the type of sourcing, i.e., whether domestic or 
foreign,  but also disclose  whether  a firm is sourcing to an  unrelated firm or to its own 
subsidiary.   
Previous  studies in international economics  that  have explored the determinants  of 
offshore sourcing activities have suggested that firm productivity plays a vital role in a firm’s 
choice of sourcing mode. Antràs and Helpman (2004) combined firm heterogeneity (Antràs, 
2003; Melitz, 2003) and property rights theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986) for simultaneously 
explaining the dimensions of sourcing location and firm boundaries. Based on assumptions of 
incomplete contractibility and relationship-specific investment, their model considers two 
types of transactions: vertical integration and outsourcing where the outside option is different. 
If a firm chooses vertical integration, its outside options increase by obtaining the residual 
rights of control and foregoing the supplier’s incentive to invest in the relationship. Antràs and 
Helpman also assume the hierarchical order of fixed costs associated with sourcing activities 
because the costs are higher for insourcing than for outsourcing and are higher in the case of 
foreign sourcing than in  domestic sourcing. As a result, the model proposed by Antràs–
Helpman  predicts the different  sourcing choices according  to firm productivity. More   2 
specifically, firms that realize higher productivity engage in FO to an unrelated supplier, while 
firms with lower productivity level choose domestic insourcing from a vertically integrated 
supplier. Further, the most productive firms pursue FI through vertical integration of a foreign 
supplier, whereas the least productive firms choose domestic outsourcing. Empirical analyses 
also support the theoretical prediction on sourcing modes by productivity. Tomiura (2007) 
found  evidence that firms engaged in FDI realize a  higher productivity level than firms 
engaged in FO using Japanese firm-level data. Kohler and Smolka (2009) reported that the 
productivity of firms engaged in insourcing through vertical integration tends to be higher than 
that of firms  choosing  to  outsource  through  an arm’s length  transaction using Spanish 
firm-level data. 
On the other hand, traditional discussions on the motivation of horizontal FDI have 
emphasized the internalization of technological knowledge as discussed in Markusen (1995). 
Firms  facing  substantial transaction costs of  preventing  the leakage of technological 
knowledge may choose vertical integration. It is therefore expected that greater accumulation 
of technological knowledge will give firms greater incentive to engage in FDI, which in turn 
will lead to FI. Although many studies have reported that R&D intensity is positively related 
to intra-firm trade (e.g., Antràs, 2003; Yeaple, 2006), the issue of which factors have the 
greatest impact on firms’ offshoring choices has received little attention in empirical literature. 
Further, the literature on management provides a contradictory view.  In recent decades, 
various  factors such as the  development of information  technology, increased pressure of 
global  competition,  and technology complexity have  forced  firms to shift from in-house 
innovation to open innovation (Christensen et al., 2005). Hence, knowledge-intensive firms 
may succeed in innovations using outside resources through buyer–supplier network, strategic 
alliance,  or research collaboration with an unrelated firm. To investigate the two 
contradictions, Mol (2005) examined  the relationship between the  R&D intensity and   3 
outsourcing using industry-level data on 52 Dutch manufacturing industries.  The paper 
demonstrated that while R&D intensity is positively correlated with outsourcing during the 
1990s, a negative correlation is found in the early 1990s, after which period R&D-intensive 
sectors started to rely on open innovation. Although the paper presented interesting evidence 
showing how “make-or-buy” decisions are made, the data on outsourcing is not distinguished 
from those on foreign sourcing, and characteristics at the firm level are not controlled in the 
presence of industry-level data.
1 
This paper empirically examines the determinants of sourcing choices distinguished in 
terms of sourcing location and firm boundaries. With respect to data on sourcing, we conduct 
a questionnaire survey on the sourcing behavior of Japanese firms by the collaboration of the 
Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). This survey covers not only the 
sourcing of production activities, but also the sourcing of services such as R&D. Further, the 
survey successfully identifies the sourcing mode each firm selects. This data helps us estimate 
each firm’s choice model in terms of make-or-buy decision and sourcing location.
2  We use a 
multinomial logit model on a large sample of Japanese manufacturing firms from 2000 to 
2005. In this paper, we specifically focus on the influence of knowledge capital on sourcing 
behavior, a topic that has not been examined adequately using firm-level data. As a proxy for 
knowledge capital and in addition to the R&D intensity in line with previous studies, we also 
introduce a patenting firm dummy into the model. The results indicate that firms’ offshoring is 
strongly correlated with knowledge capital measured by their R&D activities and patenting 
even after controlling other firm characteristics such as productivity, capital intensity, firm age, 
and export status. As for firm boundaries in offshoring, R&D-intensive or patenting firms are 
                                                   
1  Ito and Wakasugi (2007) examined the determinants of overseas R&D undertaken by multinational enterprises, 
using affiliate firm level data, and reported that knowledge intensive parent firms expand their overseas R&D 
activities.   
2  Ito et al. (2007) provided a comprehensive description of this survey.     4 
more inclined to choose FI than outsourcing. These results suggest that knowledge-intensive 
firms internalize their technological knowledge while actively exploiting foreign resources.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our data and 
empirical strategy for  examining  the relation between offshoring choices and firm 
characteristics. Section 3  presents  descriptive  statistics and estimation results of  our 
multinomial logit model. Section 4 concludes with a summary. 
 
2. Sourcing modes and Firm Characteristics 
2.1 Data 
We obtain basic information on firm characteristics and performances from the Basic Survey 
of Japanese Business Structure and Activities (Kigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa, in Japanese) for 
the period 1997–2005, conducted by the Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(henceforth METI survey). This annual national survey is mandatory for all firms with 50 or 
more employees and paid-up capital or investment fund exceeding 30 million yen in the 
mining, manufacturing, wholesale, retail, and food and beverage industries.   
The data on offshore sourcing activities were collected from the Survey of Corporate 
Offshore Activities (Kigyo Kaigai Katsudo Chosa, in Japanese), an academic survey conducted 
by RIETI (henceforth RIETI survey) on 14,062 manufacturing firms listed in the METI survey. 
The RIETI survey succeeded in collecting responses from 5,528 firms. Given that other 
previously available firm-level data on offshoring had been unable to cover the entire 
manufacturing industry and included only a limited number of firms, this survey is clearly 
advantageous in terms of its coverage. This survey also provides direct information on the 
binary choice of domestic sourcing and foreign sourcing, both of which are explicitly   5 
distinguished from arm’s-length purchases in marketplace.
3  The data on the status of offshore 
sourcing five years ago is also made available as a retrospective question, while the present 
survey itself is a one-shot survey. Hence, we match the METI data with the RIETI data in 
2000 and 2005. As a result, we draw from 8,615 observations on 4,799 firms with accurate 
information on the variables of interest.   
With respect to  data on sourcing modes, foreign sourcing modes  are  further 
differentiated  into  FI,  defined as contracting out to a firm’s  own  foreign  affiliates while 
holding majority ownership and FO, which is contracting out to unrelated firms; in contrast, 
domestic sourcing modes are not differentiated in terms of firm boundaries. Therefore, we can 
identify the three types of sourcing modes for each firm: FI, FO, and domestic both insourcing 
and outsourcing (DOM), and no sourcing with subcontracting out (NO). As the RIETI survey 
allows the respondent firms two or more answers, crossing over three modes may be included 
in the data. Cases where two modes or more are engaged at the same time account for 27 
percent of the total sourcing firms. We find that firms engaging in foreign sourcing are also 
engaged in domestic sourcing, while only 1.8 percent of sourcing firms exclusively conduct FI 
or FO other than domestic sourcing. These facts support the order of fixed costs for each 
sourcing mode. As in Antràs and Helpman (2004), we assume that the order of fixed costs f 








I f f f f > > > , where each superscript denotes foreign or 
domestic, and each subscript denotes insourcing or outsourcing. To construct a categorical 
variable that exclusively indicates a sourcing mode, we assign each firm to a unique category 
corresponding to the highest fixed cost. For example, if a firm simultaneously engages in FI, 
FO, and DOM, we assign it to the FI mode. Table 1 shows the distribution of firms with 
respect to the sourcing modes for the two periods. In the sample, approximately two-thirds of 
                                                   
3  In this survey, “sourcing” is defined as contracting out to other independent legal entities based on explicit 
contracts detailing specifications or other dimensions of the outsourced tasks. See Ito et al. (2007) for detailed 
information of the RIETI survey.   6 
the firms engage in sourcing activities involving contracting out. The share of foreign sourcing 
firms (FI and FO) increases from 16 percent to 21 percent for five years (2000–2005), while 
that of domestic sourcing firms decreases by 4 percentage point.   
                              
(Table 1) 
   
2.2 Empirical Strategy and Specification 
On the basis of Japanese firm-level data that identifies sourcing modes, we assume that firms 
have four choices: (1) FI: offshore sourcing from related suppliers, (2) FO: offshore sourcing 
from unrelated foreign suppliers, (3) DOM: sourcing from domestic suppliers, and (4) NO: 
non-sourcing. In order to empirically test the relation between knowledge capital and specific 
choices of sourcing modes, we employ a multinomial logit model using the firms’ chosen 
sourcing  modes as a qualitative variable. The multinomial logit model, which provides 
probabilities for a choice m taken by firm i, is expressed as follows: 
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X       for m = 1, 2, 3, and 4,                  (1) 
 
where  i Y   denotes  the  profit  obtained  from  different choices;  i X   denotes  the vector of 
explanatory variables comprising firm characteristics that affect profit;  m β′   is the vector of 
parameters on choice m. Taking the coefficients of choice 3 (DOM) as the base category, 
namely  0 3 = ′ β , the log-odds ratios of choosing m over the base choice can be formulated as 
follows: 

















,   for m = 1, 2, and 4.                               (2) 
 
The estimated coefficients are obtained by applying the maximum likelihood method 
under the  assumption of the independence of irrelevant  alternatives  (IIA).  For  firm 
characteristics, we introduce the following variables as independent variables. The key 
explanatory variable in this study is the proxy variable for a firm’s knowledge capital. We 
employed two observable variables as proxies. One is the R&D intensity measured as the 
R&D investment over value added (I / Y), and the other is patenting firm dummy (P), which 
takes the value one if the firm has a patent and zero if otherwise.
4  As shown by Tomiura 
(2007) and Kohler and Smolka (2009), firm productivity would affect the choices of the 
sourcing modes if the amount of fixed costs varies across sourcing activities, as Antràs and 
Helpman (2004) have suggested in their theoretical analysis. As a productivity measure at the 
firm  level, we use estimated TFP for each firm  for the period 1997–2005. To avoid the 
endogeneity problem of input, the production function is estimated by the procedure put forth 
by  Levinsohn  and  Petrin  (2003).
5  We retrieve data on real  value-added,
6  labor input 
measured on the basis of the number of employees and real capital stock
7  from the METI 
survey. Assuming that investment cost sharing in physical capital is easier than cost sharing in 
                                                   
4  Regarding patent data, the sampled firms report zero accounts for two-thirds of the observations. We therefore 
focus on the discrete change in probability when a firm turns out to be patenting firm, although data on the 
number of patents are available. 
5  Purchase of input is used as a proxy variable of productivity shock. Labor share and capital share are set at 
0.76 and 0.23, respectively. We have also used investment as an alternative proxy, as proposed by Olley and 
Pakes (1996); however, the results were almost the same. To cover firms with zero investment, we choose the 
estimator from the Levinsohn–Petrin procedure. 
6  Value added is defined as the total sales minus the total cost of the goods sold and general and administrative 
costs plus wage payments, rental, depreciation, and tax costs. The data on value is deflated by the input and 
output deflator at the three-digit industry level provided by the Japan Industry Productivity (JIP) Database 2008 
published from RIETI. 
7  While firms report the book value of fixed tangible assets, this is transformed into real values using the ratio of 
the real value of fixed tangible assets to their book value at the 3-digit industry level provided by Tokui et al. 
(2007). The investment goods deflator used for deflating the value of investment flows and the depreciation rate 
have been taken from the JIP Database 2008. The real capital stock is calculated by the perpetual inventory 
method.   8 
labor input, Antràs (2003) showed that firms engaged in FO are more labor intensive than 
firms engaged in FI. To incorporate this intuition, the capital-labor ratio (K/L) calculated as 
real capital stock over the number of employees  is also included in the  model. The 
accumulated experience of firms might be a factor in increasing the probability of decisions 
regarding further sourcing. Therefore, for the estimation, we include the firm age (AGE), 
which is defined as the number of years since the firm was established in the equation. The 
degree of a firm’s internationalization may also influence the probability of decisions on the 
sourcing modes. Exporting firms  may obtain more information on  overseas markets and 
suppliers through dealings with foreign countries and may engage more easily in FO. To 
control for this factor, we introduce exporter dummy (EX) in the model. The base estimation 
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  for m = 1, 2, and 4,    (3) 
 
where t denotes the two years, 2000 and 2005, for which data on the sourcing modes are 
available. In this specification, we first focus on the coefficient of the R&D intensity,  4 , m β . 
There is, however, a possibility that passing through TFP exists under the influence of the 
R&D intensity on the probability of decisions on the sourcing modes, because TFP can be 
explained by R&D input, given that TFP is a residual of the production function. In other 
words, TFP is considered an endogenous variable, and the correlation with the unobserved 
factor is in question. On the other hand, the standard instrumental variable (IV) regression 
technique cannot be applied to a discrete choice model. To control for the contribution of 
R&D through TFP and a possible endogeneity of TFP, we employ the control function (CF)   9 
approach to the limited dependent variable model proposed by Blundell and Smith (1989). 
One key feature of the CF approach is that the unobserved factor is treated as an omitted 
variable. The procedure is summarized as follows. In the first stage, we gain OLS residuals 
from the regression of the endogenous variable on IV and covariates of the second stage 
equation. In the second stage, we estimate the choice model including the OLS residuals as 
explanatory variables. For the error structure of TFP expressed in the first stage equation, we 
derive the model of TFP growth explained by the R&D intensity based on the production 
function framework. A firm’s TFP growth is explained by technical change attributed to the 
growth of knowledge stock  it r ∆ . Because it is difficult to directly observe the growth of the 









































+ = ∆ ρ γ γ γ 1 ln ,                              (4) 
 
where  γ   is  the knowledge-stock  elasticity  of value added,  R Y ∂ ∂ = ρ , and  it R ∆   is the 
R&D investment expressed in flow ( it I ). We take a one-period lag for the R&D intensity as is 
customary in studies on productivity and R&D. The structure of the current TFP level is 
therefore presented as the following equation, wherein we bring the lagged TFP term to the 
right-hand side.   
 
( ) it it it it it it e Y I z TFP TFP + + + = − − − 1 1 1 ln ln ρ φ θ ,                                     
(5) 
 
                                                   
8  For the derivation of knowledge capital flow, we drew on Griffith et al. (2003), Jones (2002), and Fors (1996).   10 
where  it e   is the error term. Hence, lagged TFP level and R&D intensity can be used as IV in 
the first stage. For an estimation of equation (5), we also add covariates used in the second 
stage, 2-digit industry dummy variables for industry-specific factors and a year dummy for a 
macroeconomic shock as explanatory variables. Table 2 describes the summary statistics for 
the main variables of interest according to sourcing mode. The first column shows that firms 
engaged in FI  through vertical integration are the  most productive and followed,  in  a 
descending order of productivity level, by FO firms, DOM, and NO. This order is consistent 
with the theoretical prediction by the Antràs–Helpman model. A similar ordering is found in 
the  firm age, R&D intensity, patent holder,  and exporter dummy. As for the logarithm 
capital-labor ratio, FI firms are also the most capital intensive, whereas the sorting among 
other sourcing modes is unclear. In other words, firms engaged in FI are likely to be the most 
productive, capital-intensive, knowledge-intensive, exporting and  the most experienced. 
Although this descriptive information provides a basis for our analysis, we need to investigate 
further to determine which factors have a dominant effect on the firms’ choices of the sourcing 
mode. In the next section, we present the estimation results for the choice model of the 




3. Empirical Results 
The  multinomial logit  model  is estimated  for  the  pooling data  of  2000  and 2005.  The 
estimation results are shown in Table 3. All models include industry dummies and a year 
dummy. The choice of domestic sourcing (DOM) is set as the base choice, and the estimated 
coefficients  therefore indicate  the  difference with the coefficient of the  DOM mode. To 
interpret the results, the relative risk ratio (RRR), which is the exponential of the estimated   11 
coefficient, is useful. RRR can be interpreted as a change in the odds ratio of choosing m 
relative to DOM by a unit change in the explanatory variable.   
Column [1] presents the estimates from a specification without the R&D intensity, 
patent dummy, and exporter dummy. For all models considered here, a possible endogeneity 
of TFP is controlled for by adding OLS residuals in  the  first stage regression. First, the 
estimated results show that the order of firm productivity is consistent with that of fixed costs 
as we assumed. It is found that the coefficients of TFP are significant and positive for FI and 
FO, while the negative coefficient is exposed in the choice of NO. Further, the Wald test result 
for examining the difference in the coefficient positively shows that TFP of firms choosing FI 
is higher than that of firms choosing FO. In other words, these results demonstrate that the 
order of the sourcing mode is sorted by productivity (i.e., FI > FO > DOM > NO), which is in 
line  with  the  theoretical conjecture  by Antràs and Helpman (2004) and other previously 
presented evidence (e.g., Tomiura, 2007; Kohler and Smolka, 2009). The same order of TFP is 
also found in the results of capital intensity and firm age. However, the significance of these 
basic firm characteristics decreases by adding R&D, patent, and export status. 
Column [2] presents the results with the R&D intensity and show that the difference in 
the R&D intensity with respect to the base choice is significant for all modes. The largest 
coefficient and the second largest coefficient are found for FI and FO, respectively, while the 
coefficient with respect to NO has a negative sign. Further, the Wald test statistics for the 
equality of coefficients on the R&D intensity between FO and FI is 14.98 with a p-value of 
0.0001, reinforcing that the difference between the two coefficients is significant. This result 
indicates that firms tend to start sourcing activity and engage in FO and FI when their R&D 
intensity rises, with all other factors held constant. In column [3], we introduce the patent 
holder dummy into the model instead of the R&D intensity. Switching to the patent holder has 
a significant and sizable contribution to choosing foreign sourcing. For FI and FO, the Wald   12 
test result also rejects the equality of coefficients on the patent holder dummy. Column [4] 
shows the results of the model including those for both R&D intensity and patent dummy. 
R&D intensity is still statistically significant at a 1 percent level, and its order of the sourcing 
mode is not changed with the added patent dummy and vice versa. Again, the Wald test result 
rejects the equality of the coefficient on the R&D intensity between FI and FO (chi-square is 
7.06 with a p-value of 0.008). The Wald test for the equality of the coefficient on the patent 
holder dummy also positively shows that the difference is significant (chi-square is 35.33 with 
a p-value of 0.000). For the FI mode, RRR is exp (0.0343) or 1.035  with respect to the 
coefficient of the R&D intensity, which means an increase in the probability relative to DOM 
by 3.5% when a firm increases the R&D intensity by 1 percentage point. Similarly, RRR is 
1.0188 for FO, which is interpreted as an increase in the relative probability by 1.9% for a unit 
change in R&D intensity, while for NO, RRR is 0.97, which indicates a decrease in the odds 
ratio by 3 percent. The results of RRR with respect to the patent dummy are interpreted by 
understanding how the probability of choosing the sourcing mode m relative to DOM changes 
if the firm is a patent holder, keeping the other variables constant. Moreover, for FI, RRR is 
2.46, which indicates an increase in the odds ratio of choosing FI relative to DOM by 146 
percent for a sourcing firm that turned patent holder. For the FO mode, the difference in the 
patent holder status is also significant and sizable, with an increase in the odds ratio by 35 
percent. In contrast, for NO firms, the result shows a decrease in the odds ratio by 31 percent 
for a firm that turned patent holder.   
Column [5] shows the results of the estimated model including exporter dummy. The 
coefficients of the exporter dummy are all significant at a 1 percent level, and the results 
indicate that, as expected, an exporting firm is more inclined to choose FO than domestic 
sourcing. It is remarkable that the odds ratio of FI relative to DOM is still influenced by both 
R&D intensity and patent holder dummy, while the difference in the odds ratio of FO over   13 
DOM diminishes after the export status is added. As for the R&D intensity, an increase is 
observed in the odds ratio when choosing FI relative to DOM by 2.1 percent, if the sourcing 
firm increases the R&D intensity by 1 percentage point. The coefficient of patent holder is 
also significant and sizable with respect to FI, with an increase in the odds ratio by 73 percent. 
The  results  suggest that firms’  sourcing  behavior  in terms of “make-or-buy”  decision is 
sensitive to their knowledge asset.
9  For other variables, the log of capital intensity and firm 
age also show a positive and significant sign with respect to FI, but the magnitude is quite 
marginal. For instance, RRR is indicates that a 1 percent increase in capital intensity raises the 
odds ratio of choosing FI relative to DOM by 0.18 percent.
10  RRR with respect to the firm 
age for FI shows that an additional year of experience is associated with an increase in the 




Regarding the validity of the IIA assumption, we check Hausman’s specification test 
that examines whether the difference in coefficients in a full model is significant when the 
model is estimated excluding one choice. We examine the test by omitting a sourcing mode 
one by one. Most results support the null hypothesis, i.e., the IIA assumption, while showing 
rejection or negative chi-square statistics in some cases.
11  Table 4 displays the estimation 
results of the model excluding NO. The main results are not changed significantly, while the 
estimation here is carried on by setting FO as the base choice for the purpose of comparison. 
For the odds ratio of FI over FO, the coefficient of R&D intensity is positive and significant, 
                                                   
9  One would expect that patenting would reflect firm size effects. We also estimate the model introducing firm 
size proxied by total sales or total employees instead of TFP; however, the results were found to be almost the 
same.   
10  For logarithm variables, RRR is calculated as an exponetial of the estimated coefficient multiplied by 0.01, so 
as to obtain the change in the odds ratio of choosing FI relative to DOM with an increase in the logarithm 
variable by 1 percent, i.e.  ( ) ( ) 01 . 0 ln 01 . 1 ln + ≈ × it it X X . 
11  Hausman and McFadden (1984) note that negative test statistics is evidence that the IIA assumption holds.   14 
whereas  the odds ratio  for DOM over FO is consistently negative and significant. The 
coefficients of patenting firm dummy also show the same sign as R&D intensity. The 
coefficients of both R&D intensity and patenting firm dummy with respect to the odds ratio of 
FI over FO are still significant even after the exporter dummy is added into the model. The 
positive and significant coefficients of both variables indicate that an R&D-intensive or a 
patenting firm is more inclined to choose FI than FO. Overall, the results from the choice 
model indicate that firms’ R&D and patenting activities contribute to offshore sourcing, and 
they have a large impact on the probability of choosing insourcing through vertical integration 




4. Concluding Remarks 
The relation between R&D and firms’ sourcing behavior has received little attention in the 
empirical literature. Furthermore, the issue of which factors have the greatest impact on 
firms’offshoring choices has not been addressed. To shed light on these points, this paper 
examines  the relation between sourcing choices and various firm characteristics  using 
Japanese firm-level data in manufacturing industries for  the  years  2000 and 2005.  The 
empirical results of the multinomial logit model indicate that firms’ technological knowledge 
asset is highly associated with offshore sourcing. These results suggest that global sourcing 
activities have been expanded by R&D-intensive firms. Moreover, they are likely to choose FI 
through vertical integration as expected by the theoretical view of internalization. Although 
one might expect that patent holders would not hesitate to subcontract to an unrelated foreign 
supplier if their technological knowledge is protected by patent rights, the estimation results 
contradict  this view. Our results may imply that knowledge-intensive firms are likely to   15 
engage in offshore insourcing to avoid technology leakage and litigation risk, even if their 
technological knowledge can be protected by intellectual property rights. This intuition is also 
reasonable,  when  we consider that expanding  global sourcing is often accompanied by 
technology transfer to foreign suppliers. While the  phenomenon designated as “open 
innovation” is observed in the utilization of foreign resources by knowledge-intensive firms, it 
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2000 323 325 1,955 1,544 4,147
7.8% 7.8% 47.1% 37.2% 100%
2005 472 463 1,957 1,576 4,468
10.6% 10.4% 43.8% 35.3% 100%













Mean 1.699 2.148 47.728 7.875 0.682 0.766
S.D 0.455 0.783 17.830 10.761 0.466 0.424
Min 0.193 -2.251 0 0 0 0
Max 3.872 5.174 109 83.056 1 1
Mean 1.632 1.875 42.280 4.766 0.471 0.497
S.D 0.501 0.908 16.572 8.234 0.499 0.500
Min -0.805 -2.079 0 0 0 0
Max 3.436 4.745 94 78.186 1 1
Mean 1.578 1.917 41.145 3.224 0.364 0.271
S.D 0.438 1.088 16.533 6.842 0.481 0.445
Min -0.104 -6.781 0 0 0 0
Max 4.032 5.541 132 63.326 1 1
Mean 1.468 1.889 40.157 1.836 0.240 0.157
S.D 0.440 1.088 16.005 4.570 0.427 0.364
Min -0.763 -4.454 0 0 0 0
Max 4.053 5.569 107 52.541 1 1
Mean 1.554 1.924 41.498 3.291 0.358 0.296
S.D 0.453 1.050 16.601 6.971 0.480 0.457
Min -0.805 -6.781 0 0 0 0













Total  19 
Table 3. Estimation Results of the Multinomial Logit Model 
   
Notes: Domestic sourcing (DOM) is set as the base. Standard errors in parenthesis; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
FI FO NO FI FO NO FI FO NO FI FO NO FI FO NO
0.724*** 0.318*** −0.554*** 0.398*** 0.217* −0.456*** 0.499*** 0.235** −0.470*** 0.289** 0.180 −0.418*** −0.0109 0.0403 −0.385***
(0.122) (0.117) (0.0739) (0.122) (0.117) (0.0743) (0.125) (0.118) (0.0748) (0.124) (0.118) (0.0748) (0.130) (0.121) (0.0756)
0.293*** 0.0779* −0.0823*** 0.241*** 0.0545 −0.0592** 0.237*** 0.0549 −0.0576** 0.204*** 0.0409 −0.0458* 0.174*** 0.0228 −0.0436*
(0.0450) (0.0404) (0.0252) (0.0463) (0.0409) (0.0253) (0.0470) (0.0409) (0.0254) (0.0478) (0.0412) (0.0254) (0.0506) (0.0421) (0.0253)
0.0234*** 0.00619** −0.00367** 0.0204*** 0.00513** −0.00238 0.0169*** 0.00383 −0.00128 0.0156*** 0.00348 −0.00085 0.00951*** 0.000427 0.000014
(0.00247) (0.00249) (0.00158) (0.00251) (0.00250) (0.00160) (0.00256) (0.00254) (0.00162) (0.00257) (0.00254) (0.00162) (0.00267) (0.00258) (0.00164)
0.0461*** 0.0241*** −0.0427*** 0.0343*** 0.0186*** −0.0308*** 0.0207*** 0.00934* −0.0249***
(0.00469) (0.00537) (0.00560) (0.00483) (0.00554) (0.00560) (0.00502) (0.00567) (0.00552)
1.039*** 0.368*** −0.466*** 0.900*** 0.294*** −0.372*** 0.548*** 0.124 −0.335***
(0.0904) (0.0861) (0.0579) (0.0934) (0.0893) (0.0602) (0.0975) (0.0919) (0.0610)
1.823*** 0.900*** −0.311***
(0.104) (0.0929) (0.0683)
−0.592*** −0.225 0.303** −0.00323 −0.108 0.197 −0.362* −0.147 0.245** 0.0313 −0.0934 0.188 0.112 −0.0516 0.176
(0.219) (0.206) (0.119) (0.213) (0.206) (0.120) (0.219) (0.205) (0.120) (0.214) (0.207) (0.121) (0.220) (0.208) (0.122)
0.269*** 0.323*** 0.0303 0.285*** 0.327*** 0.0305 0.319*** 0.339*** 0.0208 0.325*** 0.339*** 0.0238 0.339*** 0.340*** 0.0270
(0.0818) (0.0807) (0.0493) (0.0827) (0.0807) (0.0495) (0.0828) (0.0808) (0.0496) (0.0833) (0.0809) (0.0496) (0.0859) (0.0815) (0.0497)
−4.135*** −2.341*** 0.652*** −3.641*** −2.202*** 0.519*** −3.910*** −2.219*** 0.518*** −3.581*** −2.146*** 0.452*** −3.522*** −2.026*** 0.410***



















1132 1356 1544 2053
72 75 78 81
−9471 −9359 −9266 −9011
8615 8615 8615 8615
Yes Yes
Constant
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Table 4. Estimation Results of the Multinomial Logit Model (Non-sourcing Omitted) 
   
Notes: Foreign outsourcing (FO) is set as the base. Standard errors in parenthesis; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively.   
FI DOM FI DOM FI DOM FI DOM FI DOM
0.396*** −0.307*** 0.179 −0.215* 0.251 −0.221* 0.102 −0.174 −0.0393 −0.0364
(0.151) (0.117) (0.152) (0.118) (0.154) (0.118) (0.154) (0.119) (0.158) (0.122)
0.234*** −0.0789* 0.199*** −0.0543 0.194*** −0.0529 0.172*** −0.0388 0.160*** −0.0195
(0.0571) (0.0417) (0.0581) (0.0421) (0.0587) (0.0422) (0.0592) (0.0424) (0.0612) (0.0433)
0.0171*** −0.00577** 0.0154*** −0.00473* 0.0131*** −0.00338 0.0123*** −0.00305 0.00913*** 0.000265
(0.00316) (0.00250) (0.00317) (0.00252) (0.00325) (0.00256) (0.00325) (0.00257) (0.0033) (0.00261)
0.0222*** −0.0251*** 0.0159*** −0.0190*** 0.0115* −0.00970*
(0.00577) (0.00547) (0.00597) (0.00559) (0.00614) (0.0057)
0.663*** −0.382*** 0.599*** −0.309*** 0.424*** −0.148
(0.114) (0.0867) (0.117) (0.0896) (0.119) (0.0923)
0.912*** −0.906***
(0.126) (0.0931)
−0.343 0.202 0.105 0.0973 −0.202 0.132 0.121 0.0864 0.125 0.0554
(0.269) (0.204) (0.268) (0.207) (0.268) (0.204) (0.269) (0.208) (0.269) (0.209)
−0.0574 −0.335*** −0.0484 −0.335*** −0.027 −0.348*** −0.0229 −0.345*** −0.0142 −0.344***
(0.105) (0.0811) (0.105) (0.0812) (0.105) (0.0813) (0.105) (0.0814) (0.106) (0.0822)
−1.811*** 2.319*** −1.475*** 2.198*** −1.689*** 2.187*** −1.449*** 2.131*** −1.529*** 1.998***




LR test chi2 537 633 681 732 1114
48 50 50 52 54
−4128 −4080 −4056 −4031 −3840
5495
Constant











[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes